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Philosophical Review 2008 117(1):77-98; DOI:10.1215/00318108-2007-025
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Front Matter

CIA Leaks

Kai von Fintel

MIT

Anthony S. Gillies

Michigan

Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, CIA). Here we argue against such "relativist" semantics. We begin with a sketch of the motivation for such theories and a generic formulation of them. Then we catalogue central problems that any such theory faces. We end by outlining an alternative story.







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