Philosophical Review current issue

Utilitarianism without Consequentialism: The Case of John Stuart Mill

Jacobson, D. — 2008-03-27

This essay argues, flouting paradox, that Mill was a utilitarian but not a consequentialist. First, it contends that there is logical space for a view that deserves to be called utilitarian despite its rejection of consequentialism; second, that this logical space is, in fact, occupied by John Stuart Mill. The key to understanding Mill's unorthodox utilitarianism and the role it plays in his moral philosophy is to appreciate his sentimentalist metaethics—especially his account of wrongness in terms of fitting guilt and resentment. Mill recognizes a fundamental moral asymmetry between the agent and others, which conflicts intractably with a presupposition of consequentialism. This allows him to differentiate three potentially conflicting evaluative spheres: morality, prudence, and aesthetics. This essay's account of Mill's utilitarianism coheres with his defense of individual liberty and his embrace of supererogation, both of which elude traditional interpretations.

Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality

Brower, J. E., Brower-Toland, S. — 2008-03-27

This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind.

The Unreliability of Naive Introspection

Schwitzgebel, E. — 2008-03-27

We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. We are not simply fallible at the margins but broadly inept. Examples highlighted in this essay include: emotional experience (for example, is it entirely bodily; does joy have a common, distinctive phenomenological core?), peripheral vision (how broad and stable is the region of visual clarity?), and the phenomenology of thought (does it have a distinctive phenomenology, beyond just imagery and feelings?). Cartesian skeptical scenarios undermine knowledge of ongoing conscious experience as well as knowledge of the outside world. Infallible judgments about ongoing mental states are simply banal cases of self-fulfillment. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.

Critical Notice of Kit Fine's Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers

Forbes, G. — 2008-03-27

In this critical review I discuss the main themes of the papers in Kit Fine's Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. These themes are that modal operators are intelligible in their own right and that actualist quantifiers are to be taken as basic with respect to possibilist quantifiers. I also discuss a previously unpublished paper of Fine's on modality and existence.

The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth

Stern, R. — 2008-03-27

Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge

Vallee, R. — 2008-03-27

Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth

Easwaran, K. — 2008-03-27

All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism

Garcia, E. V. — 2008-03-27

Psychiatry in the Scientific Image

Graham, G. — 2008-03-27

Brute Rationality

Shemmer, Y. — 2008-03-27

Expression and the Inner

Neta, R. — 2008-03-27

Situations and Individuals

Zvolenszky, Z. — 2008-03-27

BOOKS RECEIVED

2008-03-27