Philosophical Review recent issues

Persistence and the First-Person Perspective

Ninan, D. — 2009-09-30

When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are "further facts," over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with physicalism and requires us to posit hidden facts about our persistence. This essay shows how to resolve this conflict using the idea that imagining from the first-person point of view is a guide to centered possibility, a type of possibility analyzed in terms of centered worlds.

The Humean Theory of Motivation Reformulated and Defended

Sinhababu, N. — 2009-09-30

This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean theory. The essay addresses the classic objection that the Humean theory cannot explain the feeling of obligation, Stephen Darwall's example of motivationally potent reasoning that is not based on preexisting desires, Thomas Scanlon's criticism that the Humean theory fails to account for the structure and phenomenology of deliberation, and the phenomenon of akrasia as discussed by John Searle. In each case a Humean account explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act.

Noumenal Affection

Hogan, D. — 2009-09-30

A central doctrine of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason holds that the content of human experience is rooted in an affection of sensibility by unknowable things in themselves. This famous and puzzling affection doctrine raises two seemingly intractable old problems, which can be termed the Indispensability and the Consistency Problems. By what right does Kant present affection by supersensible entities as an indispensable requirement of experience? And how could any argument for such indispensability avoid violating the Critique's doctrine of noumenal ignorance? This essay develops a new solution to both problems, setting out from the continuity between Kant's early and mature views on sensibility and mind-world relations. Kant's early writings subscribe to an interactionist cosmology opposed to both Leibniz's preestablished harmony and Malebranche's occasionalism. The modern debate on mind-world relations shaping Kant's early cosmology points us to a widely recognized motivation for interactionism, turning on a constraint on agency within certain noninteractionist cosmologies. In particular, Kant's early conversion to a libertarian theory of freedom, together with his rejection of occasionalism, provides the basis for a compelling argument for the indispensability of world-mind affection relations. Extended to the transcendental idealist framework, the same argument reveals noumenal affection as an indispensable presupposition of some knowledge claims consistently upheld by Kant. This leads in turn to a satisfying solution to the Consistency Problem, showing that the doctrine of noumenal affection is not merely consistent with, but is partly motivated by, Kant's commitment to noumenal ignorance.

The Metaphysics of Everyday Life

Kearns, S. — 2009-09-30

The Autonomy of Morality

Bagnoli, C. — 2009-09-30

Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art

Uidhir, C. M. — 2009-09-30

Plotinus and the Presocratics: A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus' "Enneads"

Wilberding, J. — 2009-09-30

Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic

Ademollo, F. — 2009-09-30

The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and Rene Descartes

O'Neill, E. — 2009-09-30

Contradiction in Motion: Hegel's Organic Concept of Life and Value

Speight, C. A. — 2009-09-30

BOOKS RECEIVED

2009-09-30

Perceptual Objectivity

Burge, T. — 2009-07-16

A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual cannot empirically represent a physical subject matter as having specific physical characteristics unless the individual can represent some constitutive conditions under which such representation is possible. The version of this view that dominated the century's second half maintained that objective empirical representation of the physical environment requires the individual to be able to supplement this representation with representation of general constitutive features of objectivity. This essay criticizes instances of this version in P. F. Strawson and Quine. It maintains that all versions of the position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology, this essay argues that unaided perception yields objective representation of the macrophysical environment. It does so in prelinguistic animals, even in animals that almost surely lack propositional attitudes. The essay concludes with explications of nondeflationary conceptions of representation and perception. It distinguishes nonperceptual sensing from perceptual representation and explicates perceptual representation as a type of objective sensory representation. Objectivity is marked by perceptual constancies. Representation is marked by a nontrivial role for veridicality conditions in explanations of the relevant states.

On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If)

Gillies, A. S. — 2009-07-16

What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and turn out to be equivalent.

Plato's Two Forms of Second-Best Morality

Wilberding, J. — 2009-07-16

In the Republic Plato presents a hierarchy of five cities, each representing a structural arrangement of the soul. The timocratic soul, characterized by its governance by spirit and its consequent desire for esteem and aversion to shame, is ranked as the second-best kind of soul, though this should strike us as surprising since the timocratic figure would seem to be duplicitous, intellectually passive, and at the mercy of the fortuitous opinions of others. This timocrat's position thus raises problems concerning the intrinsic value of the spirited part of the soul, problems that are best solved by comparing the auxiliary to the timocrat, both of whom represent different forms of second-best morality. A lengthy discussion of the early education's effect on the spirited part shows how the auxiliary represents the best kind of moral agent that the second-best nature (silver-souled individuals) can develop into. This is because the early education ensures that the auxiliary and the philosopher share the same basic structure of soul, with reason being in control of each, though the auxiliary's natural deficiencies create some limitations in terms of his or her moral self-sufficiency. The timocrat by contrast represents the second-best kind of moral agent that the best nature (gold-souled individuals) can develop into. The timocrat is morally inferior to the auxiliary and seems to embody Homeric shame-culture. Plato is critical of this approach to morality, but the timocrat justifiably occupies the second position in the hierarchy on account of his or her concern for the opinions of others.

Aristotle

Betegh, G. — 2009-07-16

Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome

Long, A. A. — 2009-07-16

Aquinas on Friendship

McInerny, D. — 2009-07-16

Kant and Skepticism

Guyer, P. — 2009-07-16

Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique

James, D. — 2009-07-16

Ignorance of Language

Ludlow, P. — 2009-07-16

The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World

Dennett, D. C. — 2009-07-16

Much Ado about Nonexistence: Fiction and Reference

Lamarque, P. — 2009-07-16

Four Views on Free Will

Miller, J. S. — 2009-07-16

Self-Knowing Agents

Butterfill, S. — 2009-07-16

BOOKS RECEIVED

2009-07-16

Production and Necessity

deRosset, L. — 2009-03-17

A major source of latter-day skepticism about necessity is the work of David Hume. Hume is widely taken to have endorsed the Humean claim: there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. The Humean claim is defended on the grounds that necessary connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable. Philosophers deploy this claim in the service of a wide variety of philosophical projects. But Saul Kripke has argued that it is false. According to Kripke, there are necessary connections between distinct existences; in particular, there are necessary connections between material objects and their material origins. This essay argues that the primary motivation for the Humean claim, Hume's datum, also motivates the key premise in an argument for the necessity of origins. The very considerations that the Humean takes to show that necessary connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable indicate that there must be some such necessary connections. Thus, in the absence of alternative support, there is no reason to believe the Humean claim.

Canny Resemblance

Abell, C. — 2009-03-17

Depiction is the form of representation distinctive of figurative paintings, drawings, and photographs. Accounts of depiction attempt to specify the relation something must bear to an object in order to depict it. Resemblance accounts hold that the notion of resemblance is necessary to the specification of this relation. Several difficulties with such analyses have led many philosophers to reject the possibility of an adequate resemblance account of depiction. This essay outlines these difficulties and argues that current resemblance accounts succumb to them. It then develops an alternative resemblance account, drawing on Grice's account of nonnatural meaning and its role in determining sentence meaning to argue that something depicts an object if it bears intention-based resemblances to the object that jointly capture its overall appearance. In addition to solving the metaphysical problem of what it is for something to depict an object, this account also sheds significant light on the epistemological issue of how we are able to work out that something depicts an object. This essay argues that our ability to work out that something depicts an object results from both our more general ability to identify intentions from the products of communicative behavior and our knowledge of stylistic conventions. This account avoids the difficulties that face rival attempts to analyze depiction in terms of resemblance. It also clarifies and explains the features that distinguish depictive from nondepictive representation.

Epistemic Relativism

Kalderon, M. E. — 2009-03-17

In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against the very coherence of epistemic relativism. This essay does two things. First, without questioning the truth of his conclusion, it argues that Boghossian's argument for that conclusion fails. Second, it argues that the avowed aim of Fear of Knowledge, to dislodge relativistic conviction, could not be served even if Boghossian's argument worked perfectly on its own terms. The eponymous fear, and not rational argument, is the source of much of the relativistic conviction to be found at large in the culture. And Fear of Knowledge simply does not address this fear.

Meaning in Spinoza's Method

Garrett, D. — 2009-03-17

A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley

Rickless, S. C. — 2009-03-17

Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy

Mayer, P. — 2009-03-17

Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief

Dole, A. — 2009-03-17

Poverty and Fundamental Rights

Baxter, H. — 2009-03-17

The Heart of Justice: Care Ethics and Political Theory

Friedman, M. — 2009-03-17

Free Will and Luck

Tognazzini, N. A. — 2009-03-17

Vagueness in Context

Gross, S. — 2009-03-17

How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties

Roca-Royes, S. — 2009-03-17

Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness

Trogdon, K. — 2009-03-17

Truth and Ontology

Keller, S. — 2009-03-17

BOOKS RECEIVED

2009-03-17

Watching, Sight, and the Temporal Shape of Perceptual Activity

Crowther, T. — 2009-01-16

There has been relatively little discussion, in contemporary philosophy of mind, of the active aspects of perceptual processes. This essay presents and offers some preliminary development of a view about what it is for an agent to watch a particular material object throughout a period of time. On this view, watching is a kind of perceptual activity distinguished by a distinctive epistemic role.

The essay presents a puzzle about watching an object that arises through elementary reflection on the consequences of two apparent truths about watching an object throughout a period of time. It proposes that the puzzle can be resolved by a view according to which for an agent to watch an object throughout a period of time is for that agent to maintain visual awareness of that object with the aim of perceptually knowing what that object is doing.

The essay goes on to make some further suggestions about how the apparatus developed in connection with the notion of watching may enable us to offer related explanations of other kinds of perceptual activity. It proposes that a useful distinction can be drawn between perceptual activities like watching which have as their aim knowledge of what an object is doing and activities like looking or visually scrutinizing which have as their aims knowledge of the states or conditions of the objects of perceptual awareness.

Truth and Freedom

Merricks, T. — 2009-01-16

Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t. Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all. Instead, those arguments are built on an uncontroversial understanding of the idea that truth depends on the world. In the final section of the article, those arguments are extended to show that foreknowledge of an action does not threaten that action's freedom.

Distorted Reflection

Briggs, R. — 2009-01-16

Diachronic Dutch book arguments seem to support both conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's Reflection principle. But the Reflection principle is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples. This essay addresses two questions: first, under what circumstances should an agent obey Reflection, and second, should the counterexamples to Reflection make us doubt the Dutch book for conditionalization?

In response to the first question, this essay formulates a new "Qualified Reflection" principle, which states that an agent should obey Reflection only if he or she is certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence in the future. Qualified Reflection follows from the probability calculus together with a few idealizing assumptions. The essay then formulates a "Distorted Reflection" principle that approximates Reflection even in cases where the agent is not quite certain that he or she will conditionalize on veridical evidence.

In response to the second question, the essay argues that contrary to a common misconception, not all Dutch books dramatize incoherence—some dramatize a less blameworthy sort of epistemic frailty that the essay calls "self-doubt." The distinction between Dutch books that dramatize incoherence and those that dramatize self-doubt cross-cuts the distinction between synchronic and diachronic Dutch books. The essay explains why the Dutch book for conditionalization reveals true incoherence, whereas the Dutch book for Reflection reveals only self-doubt.

Careers and Quareers: A Reply to Burge

Shoemaker, S. — 2009-01-16

Tyler Burge argues on the basis of an account of memory that the notion of quasimemory cannot be used to answer the circularity objection to psychological accounts of personal identity. His account implies the impossibility of the "Parfit people," creatures psychologically like us who undergo amoeba-like fission at the age of twenty-one, with only one offshoot allowed to survive, and who have "quareers," made up of the career of the original person and the career of the sole survivor, that exhibit the same sort of psychological continuity that characterizes normal human careers, and are such that epistemic warrant is preserved across the episodes of fission and often involves quasimemories that are not memories. But what he says about memory does not support the denial that such creatures are possible. Where he thinks de se attitudes are necessary, de se^* attitudes, indexed to quareers instead of to careers, would serve equally well. It is further argued that the circularity objection to psychological accounts can be answered without appeal to the notion of quasi-memory. Because of the internal relations between the causal profiles of mental states and the persistence conditions of their possessors, in principle there can be a "package deal" definition that simultaneously defines both.

The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle

Kamtekar, R. — 2009-01-16

Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and Mathematician King

Schofield, M. — 2009-01-16

Thomas Reid's Theory of Perception

Harris, J. A. — 2009-01-16

The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid

Copenhaver, R. — 2009-01-16

Can God Be Free?

Pereboom, D. — 2009-01-16

Varieties of Meaning

Shea, N. — 2009-01-16

Reflections on Meaning

Swanson, E. — 2009-01-16

Objects of Metaphor

Hills, D. — 2009-01-16

Reading Cavell

Lippitt, J. — 2009-01-16

BOOKS RECEIVED

2009-01-16